The Community Reinvestment Act: A Boost to Low- and Moderate-Income Communities, a Set-Back for Minority-Owned Banks by Beyer, Laura Turner
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 22
1997
The Community Reinvestment Act: A Boost to
Low- and Moderate-Income Communities, a Set-
Back for Minority-Owned Banks
Laura Turner Beyer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laura T. Beyer, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Boost to Low- and Moderate-Income Communities, a Set-Back for Minority-Owned
Banks, 1 N.C. Banking Inst. 387 (1997).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol1/iss1/22
The Community Reinvestment Act: A Boost to Low- and
Moderate-Income Communities, a Set-Back for Minority-
Owned Banks
I. INTRODUCTION
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA or Act) requires all
banks to meet the credit needs of the communities in which they are
chartered! Under the CRA, big banks may no longer overlook low-
and moderate-income communities; instead, they must increase their
lending in underserved areas.2 Commentators suggest that the CRA
poses significant problems for many minority-owned banks because it
forces big banks to compete in markets traditionally served by mi-
nority banks? The president of the North Milwaukee State Bank, a
minority-owned bank, commented that "[a]s CRA becomes a reality,
white-owned institutions are coming after our business customers-
customers that they wouldn't take a chance on before."4
One example of a minority-owned bank affected by CRA com-
pliance is Victory Savings Bank, the only African-American-owned
bank in South Carolina? Today, Victory Savings Bank faces serious
competition from larger banks that are "taking away its once-faithful
customers., 6 Even black churches are leaving Victory Savings Bank
and banking with more "mainstream" banks.7 Victory Savings
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994). Specifically, the Act states that "regulated finan-
cial institutions are required by law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the
convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do business."
12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1).
2. Cf. Joseph Moore, Comment, Community Reinvestment Act and Its Impact on
Bank Mergers, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 412, 414-15 (1997) (explaining that Congress
passed the CRA after neighborhood activists demonstrated that banks were engaging in
"redlining," or refusing to make loans in low- and moderate-income communities, and
emphasizing that the focus of the CRA was on banks' practice of transferring funds out-
side of their local communities "not race, ethnicity, [or] gender").
3. See Nanine Alexander, Tough CRA Rules Hurting Minority Banks, U.S. BANKER,
Sept. 1991, at 70; see also Veronica Byrd, Black Bankers Seek Broader Market, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at 33 (explaining that minority-owned banks are facing growing
competition as a result of the "heightened enforcement" of the CRA).
4. Alexander, supra note 3, at 70 (statement of Snow Mitchell).
5. See Rick Brooks, Minority-Owned Banks Struggle as Customers Defect to Big
Rivals, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1996, S1.
6. Id.
7. See id.
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Bank's owner specifically identified two black congregations which
borrowed from NationsBank rather than Victory Savings Bank to
construct new sanctuaries He indicated that the choice was easy for
the churches because NationsBank offered the most competitive loan
terms in the city.9 NationsBank's rates were significantly "below the
market, [so] there was no way [to] effectively compet[e] with them."'
Another example of a minority-owned bank that has directly felt
the consequences of big bank activity in low- to moderate-income
communities is Boston Bank of Commerce, an African-American-
owned institution serving the Roxbury and Mattapan neighborhoods
in Boston." This bank was nearly forced out of the mortgage market
by a "flood of cheap credit" from Fleet Bank, Bank of Boston, and
other banks trying to improve their community lending in an effort to
comply with the CRA. 2 Victory Savings Bank and Boston Bank of
Commerce illustrate the plight of many minority banks facing fierce
competition from their more "mainstream" peers as a result of the
CRA.
This Comment discusses the effects of the CRA both as a vehicle
to improve banking services in low- and moderate-income communi-
ties and as a barrier to the continued success of minority-owned
banks. This Comment begins by summarizing the history and nature
of minority-owned banks.' Next, it briefly describes the nature and
purpose of the Community Reinvestment Act14 and explores the ef-
fects of the CRA on both majority- and minority-owned banks.'"
Finally, this Comment identifies strategies minority-owned banks
have adopted to better compete with larger financial institutions. 6
II. HISTORY AND NATURE OF MINORITY-OWNED BANKS
In order to fully explore the impact of the CRA on minority-
owned banks, one must first examine three preliminary questions.
First, what is a minority-owned bank? Second, in what historical con-
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Id. (statement of T.R. McConnell, the chairman and chief executive officer of
Victory Savings Bank) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. See John R. Wilke, Jump in Home Loans to Minorities Has Multiple Payoffs, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 25, 1996, at 1, 5A.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 17-49 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 76-124 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 125-74 and accompanying text.
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text did minority-owned banks arise? Finally, what is the nature of
these banks?
Federal government criteria classify minority banks as "any de-
pository institution ... [in which] more than [fifty] percent of the
ownership or control ... is held by [one] or more minority individu-
als; and more than [fifty] percent of the net profit or loss of which
accrues to [one] or more minority individuals."17 In addition, the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA) limits "minority" to African-American, Hispanic-
American, Asian-American, or Native-American individuals.18
The first minority-owned banks in the United States began oper-
ating in 1866.19 The Freedman's Savings and Trust Company, one of
the original minority banks, opened just after the Civil War." A
group of African-American businessmen created this bank to estab-
lish thrift and prosperity among newly freed slaves.21 The small group
of businessmen who started the Freedman's Savings and Trust Com-
pany became the "founding fathers" of the black banking and
insurance industries.2
Despite the establishment of some minority-owned banks as
early as the late nineteenth century, these banks did not experience
substantial growth until the latter half of the twentieth century.' The
Nixon administration prompted part of this growth by advocating the
17. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183,521 (1989).
18. See id. Congress passed FIRREA out of concern for the degree to which mergers
and acquisitions and financial insolvency were negatively affecting minority banks. FIR-
REA contains a provision that supports the preservation of minority-owned banks.
William T. Marshall, Preserving the Future, AM. COMMUNITY BANKER, Aug. 1996, at 16,
20.
19. See Douglas A. Price, Minority-Owned Banks: History and Trends, ECON.
COMMENT. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland), July 1, 1990.
20. See SHELLEY GREEN & PAUL PRYDE, BLACK ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN AMERICA
23 (1990).
21. See id. Frederick Douglass, one of the founders of the bank, proclaimed:
The mission of the Freedman's Bank is to show our people the road to a share of
the wealth and well being of the world. It has already done much to lift the race
into respectability, and with their continued confidence and patient cooperation,
it will continue to reflect credit upon the race and promote their welfare.
Id.
22- See id.
23. See Kenneth J. Hicks, The Spectrum of Minority Banks: New American Banker
Survey Shows Total of 105, AM. BANKER, Oct. 18, 1984, at 1, 8. For example, Asian
banking began in San Francisco in 1937, but they exploded in the late 1970s and early
1980s due to rapidly growing immigrant communities in Los Angeles and San Francisco.
See Terrence O'Hara, Calif.'s Asian Banks Feel the Sting of CRA, AM. BANKER, Dec. 21,
1993, at 6.
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creation of minority-owned banks that would focus their lending ac-
tivities on the needs of minority communities in order to bring those
communities into the "nation's economic mainstream."24 Specifically,
President Nixon signed Executive Orders designed to develop a pro-
gram to strengthen minority business.2 During this period, many
minority-owned banks prospered, as they were one of the few places
minorities could hope to be approved for home loans.26
Minority-owned banks "[e]stablished a niche in communities
underserved by the mainstream banking industry and [became] criti-
cal to the growth and development of these communities."'
Furthermore, minority-owned bank customers developed a strong
sense of allegiance to those banks because minority banks served
them even after the larger institutions turned them away.s Today,
however, this loyalty is beginning to fade as aggressive "mainstream"
banks move in to areas that have historically been the domain of the
minority-owned banks.
After examining both the definition and history of minority-
owned banks, it is significant to consider the nature of these banks as
well. Many researchers have conducted studies over the years com-
paring the performance of minority-owned banks with the
performance of nonminority-owned banks.2 The results of these
studies are contradictory? For example, some indicate that minor-
24. William M. Isaac, A Head Start for Development Banks: Clinton Plan Could
Build on Minority Institutions, AM. BANKER, Jan. 7, 1993, at 4.
25. See Price, supra note 19.
26. See Brooks, supra note 5. For example, Citizens Federal Savings Bank, in Bir-
mingham, Alabama, grew into one of the country's largest African-American-owned
financial institutions with approximately $86 million in assets from an initial capital of
$350,000. See id.
27. Franklin Smith, Black Bankers Undaunted by the Freedom Fiasco, AM. BANKER,
July 11, 1991, at 8 (statement of Bruce Gamble, executive director of the Washington-
based National Bankers Association, which represents minority-controlled banks)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
28. See Brooks, supra note 5.
29. See Iftekhar Hasan & William C. Hunter, Management Efficiency in Minority-
and Women-owned Banks, ECON. PERSP. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago), March/April
1996, at 20.
30. See id. Authors Hasan and Hunter warn that one must exercise caution when
comparing minority-owned with nonminority-owned banks on the basis of broadly de-
fined markets or locational attributes. Some studies suggest it is not correct to equate
differences in operating performance with differences in ownership and customer ethnic-
ity or both unless the two sets of banks operate in essentially identical or very similar
markets, referring to their economic and demographic characteristics. See id (citing R. T.
Clair, The Performance of Black-owned Banks in their Primary Market, ECON. REV. (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Dallas), Nov. 1988, at 11; William C. Hunter, Chicago Minority Banks
and Public Policy, Nw. U. BANKING RES. CENTER (1978); Seyed Mehdian & Elyas Ely-
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ity-owned banks are smaller, less profitable, and "more expenditure
prone" than similar groups of nonminority banks." In addition, more
dated studies showed that minority-owned banks operated with lower
ratios of equity capital to assets, utilized more conservative asset
portfolio management policies, and experienced higher loan losses
than nonminority banks.32 However, a more recent study found that
minority banks had "improved their capital ratios and decreased
their holdings of liquid assets, while expanding their use of purchased
funds. 3 3 Furthermore, the recent study showed no significant differ-
ences in the pricing and asset liability management decisions in the
financial performance of minority-owned banks compared to nonmi-
nority-owned banks.' In essence, difficulties arise when researchers
attempt to devise samples of minority- and nonminority-owned banks
which serve similar market areas. Consequently, one finds conflict-
ing results in the studies assessing the performance and long-term
viability of minority-owned banks.
Despite these conflicting studies, most commentators agree that
minority-owned banks possess at least four characteristics that make
their existence and long term survival more tenuous than that of
"mainstream" banks.35 First, minority-owned banks have more diffi-
culty raising capital than "mainstream" banks? 6 This struggle to raise
asiani, Productive Efficiency Performance of Minority and Nonminority-owned Banks: A
Nonparametric Approach, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 933 (1992)).
31. Hasan & Hunter, supra note 29, at 20 (citing Mary Colby, Community Reinvest-
ment Focus Shifts to Commercial Lending, BANK MGMT., June 1993, at 49).
32. See id. at 20 (citing Timothy Bates & William Bradford, An Analysis of the Port-
folio Behavior of Black-owned Commercial Banks, 35 J. FIN. 753 (1980); John T.
Boorman and Myron L. Kwast, The Startup Experience of Minority-owned Commercial
Banks: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J. FIN. 1123 (1974); Andrew F. Brimmer, The Black
Banks: An Assessment of Performance and Prospects, 26 J. FIN. 379 (1971); Myron L.
Kwast, New Minority-owned Commercial Banks: A Statistical Analysis, 12 J. BANK RES.
37 (1981)).
33. Id (citing David R. Meinster & Elyas Elyasiani, The Performance of Foreign-
owned, Minority-owned, and Holding-company-owned Banks in the U.S., 12 J. BANKING
& FIN. 293 (1988)). However, the studies' authors observed that African-American-
owned banks seemed to maintain the financial performance characteristics indicative of
the performance of minority-owned banks in the 1960s and 1970s. See id.
34. See id.
35. See, e.g., Paul S. Nadler, The Plight of Minority-Owned Banks, AM. BANKER, Oct.
7, 1991, at 4 (recognizing five "weaknesses" of minority-owned banks: need for capital,
lack of quality loans, lack of significant deposits, "marketing dilemma," and high costs of
doing business).
36. See id. Minority-owned banks find it difficult to raise capital:
Maintaining adequate capital is a challenge for black-owned banks, according to
Carlton J. Jenkins, the managing director at Founders [National Bank of Los
Angeles], because 'none of the traditional sources of capital, such as investment
bankers, large black corporations, high net-worth investors, pension funds and
1997]
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capital limits a bank's ability to make loans because lending ability
depends on the amount of capital the bank has to protect itself
against loan losses.37 With only a small amount of capital available to
prevent loan losses, banks often find they cannot make enough loans
to meet the demands of their customers. 8
In addition to the difficulty in raising capital, most minority-
owned banks have smaller deposit sizes than "mainstream" banks. 9
These relatively small deposit sizes have resulted in less profits for
minority-owned banks compared to the nonminority banks, making
their long-term survival more tenuous than their more "mainstream"
peers.'o In other words, "mainstream" banks depend to a large extent
on the significant deposits of their affluent sponsors, but minority
banks generally have less affluent sponsors, resulting in less substan-
tial deposits." In fact, a large number of minority bank customers use
the banks as "deposit vaults"--depositing the week's paycheck and
withdrawing a portion of that deposit every couple of days.42 Ulti-
mately, this smaller account size translates into additional paperwork
and more labor time for each deposit dollar, which increases person-
nel expenses relative to deposits and results in less profit for the
bank.43
The profitability of many minority-owned banks is also affected
by the fact that many of them have high costs of doing business. 44 For
example, minority-owned bank's offices are typically located in "low-
income areas that suffer disproportionately from recessions and high
mutual funds have ever seriously focused their resources on minority banks.'
Byrd, supra note 3, at 36.
37. See Mary Colby, Community Reinvestment Focus Shifts to Commercial Lending,
BANK MGMT., June 1993, at 50.
38. See id. According to William Isaac, a former chairman of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, "[m]any a minority bank was allowed to open on a relative shoe-
string in terms of capital, and supervision and enforcement were relaxed. These were
hardly favors for a group of institutions that were high-risk by definition." Isaac, supra
note 24, at 4.
39. See Nadler, supra note 35, at 4; see also GREEN & PRYDE, supra note 20, at 36-37.
40. See GREEN & PRYDE, supra note 20, at 36-37.
41. See Nadler, supra note 35, at 4. As a result of the failure of Freedom National
Bank, a long-established minority bank in New York City, many individuals who had
more than $100,000 on deposit at the bank lost funds. This loss made people wary of
keeping large deposits in minority-owned banks. See id. Furthermore, if minority-owned
banks "reported mean deposit sizes and personnel costs that were identical to the national
averages, we would suspect that they were not serving the lower-income saver that typi-
fies the inner-city population." GREEN & PRYDE, supra note.20, at 37.
42. See Nadler, supra note 35, at 4; see also GREEN & PRYDE, supra note 20, at 37;
Price, supra note 19.
43. See GREEN & PRYDE, supra note 20, at 37.
44. See Smith, supra note 27, at 8.
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rates of business failure and ... crime."'' Consequently, the banks
must implement costly preventative measures in order to maintain a
safe banking environment for their customers. 4 The final factor
making the survival of minority-owned banks more tenuous is that
these banks generally offer smaller, higher-risk loans with lower av-
erage yields than do majority-owned banks.47 This further hinders the
profitability of minority banks.4
In sum, many commentators suggest that the future of minority-
owned banks will be affected by their inability to raise capital easily,
their characteristically small deposit size, their high cost of doing
business, and their tendency to focus on relatively small, higher risk
loans. Perhaps, though, the most significant obstacle to the long-term
survival of minority-owned banks is the Community Reinvestment
Act.
49
III. COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT Acr
In 1977, Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act.
50
The statute mandates that regulated institutions demonstrate that
their deposit facilities meet the convenience and needs of their com-
munities, that the convenience and needs of their communities
includes credit and deposit needs, and that regulated institutions have
a "continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit
needs of the local communities in which they are chartered." 1 The
CRA expressly states that its purpose is to require federal financial
supervisory agencies to use their authority to "encourage" regulated
institutions "to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in
which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound opera-
tion of such institutions. 52 Significantly, federal financial supervisory
agencies have encouraged regulated institutions to focus their lending
efforts on those communities whose members have traditionally been
loyal minority-owned bank customers.
45. Id.
46. See Nadler, supra note 35, at 4.
47. See Isaac, supra note 24, at 4.
48. See id
49. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907.
50. Id.
51. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b). The Comptroller of the Currency is responsible for exam-
ining national banks; the Office of Thrift Supervision is responsible for federally insured
savings associations and savings and loan holding companies; the Federal Reserve exam-
ines state member banks; and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation examines
federally insured state nonmember banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 2902(1).
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Despite its arguably commendable purpose, the CRA has been
the subject of much criticism. Specifically, commentators criticize the
Act as lacking strong enforcement mechanisms." The CRA requires
that the federal financial supervisory agencies "assess the institution's
record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe
and sound operation of such institution."' Following this assessment,
the Act mandates that a supervisory agency complete a written
evaluation of the bank's CRA performance, rating the institution ac-
cording to one of four possible grades.5 Finally, the Act requires that
an institution's supervisory agency take its CRA performance into
account when evaluating applications related to charters, deposit in-
surance, branches, and mergers or acquisitions. 6  Thus, the CRA
entails the
recognition that a community's financial needs include
credit as well as deposit needs, a purpose of
"encouraging" institutions to meet those credit needs,
and finally a directive that an institution's CRA per-
formance be one aspect of the examination as well as
a factor to be "taken into account" when [a supervi-
sory agency] assess[es] the institution's applications
for new or expanded privileges.'
The provisions of the Act that require consideration of an insti-
tution's CRA performance in applications for expanded privileges act
as the only "teeth" of the Act and serve to check perceptions of lazy
regulatory attitude toward CRA compliance. 8 In reality, these teeth
have limited bite; 9 "only between one and two percent of applica-
tions filed with the Federal Reserve have been protested by
53. More specifically, the enforcement efforts of regulators have been under attack
by the financial institutions regulated under the Act, community groups, and Congress
itself. See A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 1431, 1431-32 (1995).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1).
55. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a)(1). The four possible ratings are: (1) Outstanding, (2)
Satisfactory, (3) Needs to improve, and (4) Substantial noncompliance. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 2906(b)(2).
56. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2).
57. Overby, supra note 53, at 1442.
58. For example, in 1989, the Federal Reserve Board rejected applications by Conti-
nental Bank Corporation and Continental Illinois Bancorp to acquire the Grand Canyon
State Bank, an Arizona bank. See id. at 1465. Continental's poor CRA performance was
a "determining factor" in this rejection. See id.
59. See Moore, supra note 2, at 423 (stating that only a small number of merger appli-
cations have been denied since the enactment of the CRA).
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community activist groups on CRA grounds since 1988, and denials
of applications on CRA grounds ... are [] rare."'  Nevertheless, fi-
nancial institutions must take CRA compliance seriously or face the
possibility of having a merger application denied.61
In response to complaints regarding enforcement of the CRA, in
July 1993 President Clinton asked the regulatory agencies to reform
the examination and enforcement system of the Act. 2 A set of re-
vised proposals emerged in October 1994, and regulators approved
the final rules in late April 1995. The revised rules began applying to
smaller institutions in January 1996, and they will go into effect for
larger institutions in July 1997.63
The new regulations establish different tests for large and small
banks.'4 Small banks are now examined under a five-area system
with primary emphasis on small business lending.6' The new regula-
tions for larger banks replace the efforts/process-based enforcement
that had been in place since 1977 with an evaluative procedure de-
signed to measure actual results in meeting the credit needs of the
institution's surrounding community, such as loans, investments, and
services to a bank's "assessment area."'  Under the Revised Pro-
60. Overby, supra note 53, at 1466.
61. See id. For example, despite the fact that BankAmerica's lead bank, Bank of
America, received "outstanding" CRA ratings in 1990 and that Security Pacific's subsidi-
ary banks consistently received "satisfactory" ratings under the Act, in BankAmerica
Corporation's application to merge with Security Pacific, the Federal Reserve Board con-
ducted several public hearings and heard testimony from over 175 witnesses regarding
CRA compliance. See idt at 1467. The merger was ultimately approved, but during the
hearing process, community groups received a promise from BankAmerica to pay $12
billion in community-based lending. See id.
62. See Moore, supra note 2, at 423 (stating that the goals of the regulators' reform
initiatives were to "(1) base CRA examinations more on results than paperwork, (2) clar-
ify performance standards, (3) make examinations more consistent, (4) improve
enforcement to provide more effective sanctions, and (5) reduce the costs and burdens of
compliance").
63. See Community Reinvestment Act: Federal Banking Agencies to Publish Addi-
tional Guidance on Revised CRA Rules, Banking Daily (BNA), Oct. 16, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Banking Library, BNABD File. Small banks are defined as those with assets of
$250 million or less and those not managed by a holding company with total assets of $1
billion or more. See Andrew W. Hogwood, Jr., Small Banks and CRA Reform No Slam
Dunk!, BANK MGMT., July/Aug. 1996, at 72.
64. See J. Tol Broome Jr., Less Paperwork, More Bank Loans: A Change in Federal
Rules is Encouraging Lending to Small Companies, NATION'S Bus., Sept. 1996, at 38.
65. See id. The evaluation areas for small banks are: loan-to-deposit ratio, percent-
age of loans in the bank's market area, loans originated for community development and
small-business purposes, geographic and income-level diversity of loans made, and re-
sponse to written complaints by consumers. See id.
66. See Overby, supra note 53, at 1469.
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posal, three tests are conducted: the "Lending Test," the
"Investment Test," and the "Service Test." Regulators combine the
institution's ratings on these three tests to determine the bank's over-
all CRA rating." The Revised Proposal places the most emphasis on
lending performance by mandating that an institution must be given a
rating of "satisfactory" or better on the lending test in order to re-
ceive an overall rating of "satisfactory" or better. 8
Under the "Lending Test," federal regulators evaluate a bank's
performance in meeting community credit needs by measuring its
home mortgage lending, small business and farm lending, community
development lending, and consumer lending if it constitutes a major
portion of the bank's business.69 The "Investment Test" gauges the
extension of institutional resources into the assessment area. Under
this test, the evaluator determines the number of "qualified invest-
ments" made, the "innovativeness" and "complexity" of the
investments, and the "responsiveness" of the institution to commu-
nity credit and development needs.' Finally, the "Service Test"
evaluates "the availability and effectiveness of a bank's systems for
delivering retail banking services and the extent and innovativeness
of its community development services."7 Federal regulators deter-
mine the institution's rating under this test by considering the
institution's dispersion of branches among its assessment area, its his-
tory of opening and closing branches, the degree to which it offers
"alternative systems" for delivering banking services to low- and
moderate-income individuals, and the variety of services offered.'
67. See Stephen D. Burwell & Christine A. McCarthy, Community Banking, 14 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 116, 122 (1995).
68. See id.
69. See Overby, supra note 51, at 1470. The institution's rating under the "Lending
Test" is based on:
the institution's responsiveness to the credit needs of its assessment area, the de-
gree of lending in its assessment area, the geographic distribution of loans
throughout its assessment area and among individuals of different income levels
and businesses, its record in meeting the credit needs of highly economically dis-
advantaged areas of its assessment area, of low income individuals, or of
businesses, its use of innovative or flexible lending practices in a safe and sound
manner to meet the credit needs of low- or moderate-income individuals and
geographies, and its leadership position in community development lending.
Id. at 1470-1471.
70. Id. at 1471-72. "Qualified investments" are characterized by "lawful investments,
deposits, membership shares, or grants that have community development as their pri-
mary purpose." Id. at 1471 n.195.




In sum, the CRA mandates that federal financial supervisory
agencies use their status to encourage regulated institutions to meet
the credit needs of their local communities.' Although the Act has
generally been applauded for this purpose, it lacked effective en-
forcement provisions until a set of revised CRA proposals was
approved by Federal Regulators in April 1995.' 4 These revised rules
measure the results of an institution's attempts to meet the credit
needs of its local communities rather than its efforts at CRA compli-
ance.75  As these revisions become fully effective, analysts will
examine whether they are in fact enhancing enforcement of the
CRA.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE CRA
Despite prior enforcement problems, federal financial supervi-
sory agencies appear successful in accomplishing the purpose of the
CRA which is to encourage regulated institutions to meet the credit
needs of their local communities. Just as drafters of the CRA had
hoped, large regulatory institutions responded to the Act and moved
into low- and moderate-income communities. At the same time the
Act has had an unanticipated effect: some minority-owned banks
now struggle to remain open in the face of fierce competition from
their more "mainstream" peers. This section of this Comment will
first review the effect of the CRA on large regulatory institutions,
and then will examine the Act's effect on minority-owned banks.
A. Effect of the CRA on Majority-owned banks
The CRA has had four major effects on majority-owned banks.
First, "mainstream" banks are coming to the conclusion that making
loans in low- and moderate-income communities is profitable. "Since
CRA, we've seen larger institutions come in and, lo and behold, dis-
cover that making home loans is good business," explained the
president of Dwelling House Savings & Loan Association in Pitts-
burgh.76 Consequently, the trend among majority-owned banks has
been to increase lending to less advantaged borrowers because it has
the potential to be profitable.' "'CRA is working....' 'Banks are
73. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
76. Marshall, supra note 18, at 21 (statement of Robert M. LaVelle).
77. See James S. Granelli, More Banks Find Profit in Loans to Inner City, L.A.
TIMES, July 24, 1996, at Di.
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finding that there are a lot of good loans to be made out there in the
low[-] and middle-income community,'" commented the Treasury
Department's top banking official.78 In reference to lending to black
churches, a vice president and community investment coordinator for
NationsBank noted," '[t]here is a whole market here that historically
as an industry we probably haven't served well, ... [and] more and
more institutions are finding out that this is good business.' ""
Despite this sudden interest in lending in low-income communi-
ties, the performance of the low-income loans will determine whether
large banks will remain in these communities. Current studies re-
garding the performance of low-income loans are inconclusive.
"Mainstream" banks have expressed some concern that the mort-
gages resulting from their aggressive low-income loan programs may
"sour" at a rate higher than other loans.'o For example, in the sum-
mer of 1995, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation told
bankers that it had begun noticing higher rates of default on low-
down-payment loans." In addition, a senior vice president at Na-
tionsBank of Charlotte, North Carolina, indicated that NationsBank
is "'starting to see some loss experience higher than in the general
market' ... [with its] affordable-loan programs."'' On the other
hand, some studies indicate that low-income borrowers make great
efforts to meet their mortgage payments." Thus, the data conflicts,
and the loans are too new to make judgments regarding their per-
formance."' In the meantime, however, as "mainstream" banks
increase their low-income lending, they will "learn where the line is
between a stretch and a bad deal."
In addition to recognizing the potential profitability of low-
income loans, large banks are aggressively moving into low- and
moderate-income communities because it can be a tremendous help
78. John R. Wilke, Home Loans to Blacks, Hispanics Soared in '94, WALL ST. J., July
19, 1995, at A2 (statement of John D. Hawke).
79. Michelle Singletary, Black Churches' Converts: Banks; Lenders Underwriting
Area-Wide Expansion of Religious Facilities, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1996, at Al, A12
(statement of Antonio Doss) [hereinafter Singletary, Religious Facilities].
80. See Wilke, supra note 11, at 5A.
81. See i. at 5A-5B.
82. Id. at 5B (statement of Catherine Bessant). Ms. Bessant also noted that a mod-
estly higher loss rate is permissible as long as it is predictable so the bank can properly
price mortgages when repackaged as securities. See id.
83. See id. at 5A.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 5B(statement of Catherine Bessant).
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in their pursuit of mergers and acquisitions.' In fact, "[t]he banking
industry is undergoing a consolidation of massive proportions, on a
scale not seen since the 1920s and 1930s."'  The fourth quarter of
1995 reflected the current trend of consolidation. In that quarter, the
Federal Reserve Board approved three giant bank mergers which
rearranged the ranking of the top ten banks in the nation." "For in-
stitutions on the sale block ... a rating of 'outstanding' by regulators
in fulfilling obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act
should make it easier to get federal approval for any merger," ac-
cording to an analyst at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods in New York. 9
Consequently, some banks in the merger market have made out-
standing community lending commitments in an attempt to impress
regulators.o For example, prior to its acquisition of First Interstate
Bancorp, Wells Fargo & Company promised forty-five billion dollars
for lower-income and small-business loans over ten years." As a re-
sult of these increased CRA compliance efforts, "outstanding"
ratings have more than doubled in four years, while "needs to im-
prove" ratings have dropped more than fifty percent.
In spite of some banks' efforts to impress regulators, expansion
applications are increasingly contested. Approximately fifty percent
86. See Moore, supra note 2, at 425 (stating that CRA commitments by banks gener-
ally insure that their merger applications will be approved by federal regulators).
87. Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic
Analysis, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1992); see also Mergers & Acquisitions: Increasing
Mega-Mergers, Unusual Twists Feature Fourth Quarter Actions, BANKING POL'Y REP.,
Jan. 15, 1996, available in Lexis, Banking Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Mergers
and Acquisitions]. On October 3, 1996, the president of the San Francisco Federal Re-
serve Bank, Robert Parry, predicted that the current trend toward bank consolidation will
continue over the next several years but at a slower pace. Community Reinvestment Act:
Small Banks Report Positive Changes in Complying with CRA Rules, Banking Daily
(BNA), Oct. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, Banking Library, BNABD File [hereinafter
Small Banks].
88. Mergers & Acquisitions, supra note 87. The three bank mergers approved by the
Fed included: Rhode Island-based Fleet Financial Groups acquisition of Connecticut-
based Shawmut National Corporation, North Carolina-based First Union Corporations
purchase of New Jersey-based First Fidelity Bancorporation, and Michigan-based NBD
Bancorp, Inc. acquisition of Illinois-based First Chicago Corporation. See id.
89. Granelli, supra note 77, at D1, D7 (statement of Thomas F. Theurkauf, Jr.).
90. See Wilke, supra note 11, at 1.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 5B. Some suggest that part of the favorable increase in CRA ratings is
attributable to "grade inflation." Id, (statement of Robert Gnaizda, director of a San
Francisco advocacy group called the Greenlining Institute). Furthermore, banks that face
a weak CRA rating will often bring in legal counsel to appeal the decision. See iL How-
ever, Federal Reserve regulators insist that the better ratings reflect improved lending
performance, as is indicated by the reports that lenders have filed. See id.
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of the merger transactions approved by Federal regulators during the
fourth quarter of 1996 were contested, 9 and a large number of the
protests against mergers and acquisitions were filed under the CRA.94
In reality, however, CRA based protests rarely block a deal.95 Never-
theless, even regulators acknowledge that they can make the
approval process longer" and more expensive. Thus, the protests
provide tremendous incentive for banks to comply with the CRA.
Arguably, the new, more stringent CRA enforcement provisions
will push large banks even further into low- to moderate-income
communities.9' Regulators have toughened the rules and will start
basing CRA ratings on an institution's actual lending record rather
than on documentation of the efforts an institution has made to in-
crease lending in inner-city and underserved communities." "'The
old act was based more on documentation. The new [act] says you
have to get results,'" according to the chairman of the Southern
Delaware Bankers Coalition for Community Reinvestment and assis-
tant compliance officer with JC Penney National Bank in Harrington,
Delaware.' "With the new CRA regulation emphasizing perform-
ance, not process.. .'we believe the CRA will be given the chance to
do the work it was intended to do,'" indicated the president of the
93. See Mergers & Acquisitions, supra note 87. The majority of the complaints were
initiated by community activist organizations who expressed concern that the transactions
would reduce or even eliminate needed services to minorities and low- and moderate-
income individuals. See id. They further argued that none of the banks involved were
doing an adequate job of serving their communities under the CRA requirements. See id.
94. See id. For a discussion of the small percentage of merger applications that have
been protested by community activists since 1988, see supra note 60 and accompanying
text. The percentage of mergers contested on CRA grounds in the fourth quarter of 1996
jumped close to fifty percent. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Thus, it appears
that the number of merger applications that are contested on CRA grounds is rising. See
generally Moore, supra note 2, at 427 (stating that, although in the past only a small num-
ber of merger applications have been rejected on CRA grounds, CRA compliance is
slowly becoming a controlling factor in the assessment of proposed mergers).
95. See Granelli, supra note 77, at D7. One explanation for the infrequent denial of
merger applications is that companies often withdraw their applications as they become
aware of negative signals from the Fed. See Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 87.
96. See Moore, supra note 2, at 429 (referring to examples of community group pro-
tests that caused delays in the merger approval process).
97. See Granelli, supra note 77, at D7. See also Moore, supra note 2, at 425
(explaining proposed legislation designed to streamline the merger approval process by
making it more efficient and less expensive).
98. Large banks will not be examined under the new procedures until July of 1997.
See Small Banks, supra note 87.
99. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
100. Kimberly Quillen, Reinvestment Act to Affect Delaware Banks, DEL. Bus. REV.,
July 24, 1995 (statement of Thomas Chambers).
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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco."' Theoretically, as the large
banks focus more on lending and less on paperwork, they will move
deeper into "underserved" communities, acquiring even more of the
customers that were traditionally loyal to minority-owned banks.
A third major effect that the CRA has had on majority banks is
that, as part of their effort to comply with the Act, they are imple-
menting creative new services and lending programs that give them a
competitive edge in low- and moderate-income communities. For
example, on December 18, 1995, NationsBank announced a $500
million, five-year affordable housing program designed for low- to
moderate-income communities." This housing program offers 100
percent home mortgage financing with extremely liberal underwrit-
ing standards. 3 The program enables qualified applicants to buy a
home at market rates with no down payment, closing costs, or appli-
cation fees."l Potential borrowers under this program will not be
penalized for regularly switching jobs or for having "seasonal" em-
ployment, and the program does not require private mortgage
insurance."5 According to housing experts, "[t]he pilot program... is
one of the largest and most comprehensive community reinvestment
initiatives in the banking industry.""' Similarly, in August 1995, Bar-
nett Bank of Jacksonville, Florida agreed to provide twenty million
dollars in loans through a program comparable to the one announced
by NationsBank. 7 The Federal Reserve governor who oversees
community lending insisted that "[t]he new programs 'have not only
leveled the playing field but begun to go in the other direction,' ... as
big lenders aggressively move into the inner city to demonstrate to
regulators that they are complying with fair-lending laws."'0 8
Additional new services and lending programs include First
Union's "affordable home mortgage" that requires a down payment
of only five percent, and First Tennessee Bank's offering of home-
loans to first-time buyers that covers up to ninety-seven percent of
the price of a house.' 9 Other initiatives by large banks in under-
101. Small Banks, supra note 87 (statement of Robert Parry, president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco).
102. See Michelle Singletary, NationsBank Plans Affordable Housing Plan, WASH.






108. Wilke, supra note 11, at 5A (statement of Lawrence Lindsey).
109. See Brooks, supra note 5.
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served areas include: credit cards, small business-loans, and twenty-
four-hour-a-day telephone banking. "They offer everything under
the sun," according to the chief executive of Citizens Federal in Bir-
mingham.
110
Further indication that "mainstream" banks are making great ef-
forts to comply with the CRA is the fact that several have created
community reinvestment programs or divisions specifically designed
to give structure to their CRA lending.' For example, First Union
has established a profit center for community lending similar to its
commercial real estate or small business lending units."' Before cre-
ating this profit center, First Union had no focused effort for
handling community development lending.' Now, the CRA lending
unit will consist of loan officers whose major responsibility will be
making community development loans."4
In sum, the CRA has had four major effects on the majority-
owned banks: (1) they recognize the potential profitability of low-
income loans; (2) they realize that moving into low- and moderate-
income communities can be helpful in their pursuit of mergers and
acquisitions; (3) they offer creative new services and lending pro-
grams that are especially appealing to low- and moderate-income
communities; and (4) they have created new CRA divisions specifi-
cally designed to give structure to their CRA lending.
B. Effect of CRA on Minority-owned banks
The "mainstream" banks' efforts at complying with the CRA are
beginning to take their toll on minority-owned banks. While all small
banks appear to be losing customers to their more "mainstream"
peers, minority-owned banks have been hit especially hard because
110. Id. (statement of Bunny Stokes, Jr.).
111. See Harry M. K. Johnston, Comment: The Task for Clinton's Development Banks
Is to Reinvent Neighborhood Banking, AM. BANKER, Mar. 25, 1993, at 4, 6.
112. See Michelle Singletary, He Wants to Prove that Community Lending Pays: At
First Union's CRA Unit, Williams Predicts a Profit, WASH. POST, May 13, 1996, at F9.
Roger L. Williams was hired by First Union in January 1996 specifically to head its com-
munity reinvestment programs in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. He
left the Federal Home Mortgage Corp., where he was a vice president managing a na-
tionwide multi-billion-dollar portfolio of nonperforming loans and the sale of multifamily
real estate. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. Williams, who is heading the community reinvestment program for First
Union, recognizes that the CRA lending unit contains some risk due to loans that do not
produce returns as strong as those of commercial real estate loans, but he points out that




the larger banks, after overlooking low-income communities for
years, have found that lending to these communities allows them to
comply with the CRA, while also helping their bottom lines."5 An
increasingly strict enforcement of the CRA "has impelled majority-
owned banks to intrude aggressively into what is often the local mar-
ket niche of many minority-owned banks and to co-opt the customer
base of minority-owned institutions by offering more competitive
products than minority-owned institutions are able to offer... 6 A
Federal Reserve Board report released on July 18, 1995 showed a
significant increase in the number of minority loans compared to the
previous year, and this report explained that the higher number of
loans was attributable to steps taken by banks to target low-income
borrowers in an effort to comply with the CRA." The report also
indicated that the number of conventional mortgages for African-
Americans rose by 55%, 42% for Hispanics, 24% for Native-
Americans, and 19% for Asians.'
The movement of "mainstream" banks into low- and moderate-
income communities is unmistakably affecting minority-owned insti-
tutions. For example, 1993 statistics showed that minority-owned
banks accounted for six of thirty-two bank failures which occurred in
that year. 9 In addition, a study of federal banking data generated by
Sheshunoff Information Services Incorporated, a bank-consulting
firm in Austin, Texas, indicated that most minority banks and thrifts
in the Texas region are losing ground to both big and small competi-
tors in that state.20 In September 1995, eighty-two percent, or
fourteen out of seventeen minority-owned banks and thrifts, were
less profitable than the average for all banks and thrifts in Texas. 1
In contrast, 1990 figures showed only half the minority-owned institu-
tions trailing behind their nonminority peers." Furthermore, some
indications suggest that as a result of this intense competition, mi-
nority-owned banks are losing a number of their most credit-worthy
115. See Brooks, supra note 5.
116. Overby, supra note 53, at 1529-30 (statement of A. Brooke Overby). Tradition-
ally, minority-owned banks have not offered a large variety of services-most offer only
"plain-vanilla products." Brooks, supra note 5.
117. See Wilke, supra note 78, at A2.
118. See id. The number of applications from minorities increased significantly over
1993, which partially triggered the increase in loans to these groups. See id.
119. See Robert B. Cox, Minority Banks Seen Lagging in CRA Arena, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 20,1993, at 1, 8.
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customers to the big banks, leaving them with a riskier pool of bor-
rowers. 3 "'In a period when everyone else is doing great' because
the economy is healthy and loan demand is strong, 'they're doing
worse,' "reports an assistant finance professor at Georgia State Uni-
versity in Atlanta. 24
Thus, although the general purpose of the CRA (to encourage
institutions to serve their local communities) seems ideal, the Act has
inadvertently had several negative effects on minority-owned banks.
Primarily, some of these banks are losing customers and experiencing
a decrease in profits.
V. MINORrrY BANKS' RESPONSE TO CRA-INSPIRED COMPETITION
Although minority-owned banks face significant new challenges
as a result of the CRA, there are at least six strategies they may
adopt to ensure their long-term survival. First, some minority-owned
banks have joined the recent trend of mergers and acquisitions as a
means of competing with the more "mainstream" banks. For exam-
ple, the African-American-owned Omnibank Corporation, the owner
of Omnibank in suburban Detroit, acquired Drexel National Bank
and Independence Bank, two African-American-owned banks in
Chicago." Omnibank Corporation bought these banks in order to
acquire a larger customer base, offer more products, decrease its
costs, and, most importantly, remain competitive. 26 Minority-owned
Mutual Community Savings Bank in Durham, North Carolina,
bought an African-American-owned bank in Greensboro, North
Carolina, in order to expand its customer base. Similarly, United
National Bank in Fayetteville, North Carolina, recently bought
branches in rural towns with the hope of attracting customers using a
small-town touch.'2 Finally, First Public Savings Bank of Los Ange-
les merged with Cathay Bancorp's Cathay Bank. Both of these
institutions were formed by Chinese-American business people who
had trouble obtaining loans.29 First Public Savings Bank says it
123. See id.
124. Id. (statement of Jocelyn Evans).
125. See Byrd, supra note 3, at 36.
126. See id.
127. See Brooks, supra note 5.
128. See id.
129. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 20. Cathay Bank was established in 1962. See id.
Currently, Cathay Bank has ten branches in southern California, fifteen branches in
northern California, and offices in Taiwan and Hong Kong. See iU. First Public Bank was




merged with Cathay Bank "in the best interests of both [its] share-
holders and [its] customers."'m These interests included meeting the
banking needs of a predominantly Asian-American population.'31
The merger eliminated First Public Savings Bank from the list of
fourteen savings institutions currently identified as Asian-American,
but the hope is that the minority character of the bank will remain in
spirit.13
2
Just as minority-owned banks are joining the trend of mergers
and acquisitions in order to survive, they are also beginning to seek
investments from the large banks to increase their access to capital.'33
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 has facili-
tated this type of fundraising. " This Act gives commercial banks
explicit CRA credit for investing in minority financial institutions.35
In fact, minority banks have begun actively seeking capital from ma-
jority-owned commercial banks, and some of the nation's biggest
banks, such as BankAmerica, Fleet, and NationsBank, have re-
sponded by investing millions of dollars in minority-owned
institutions.' 36 According to the president of minority-owned Liberty
Bank & Trust Co. in New Orleans, the new law created a "win-win-
win situation. The majority bank wins, because it gets CRA credit;
the minority bank wins, because the capital marketplace is limited;
and the inner-city businesses win, because the minority banks have




133. See Colby, supra note 37, at 50.
134. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106
Stat. 3672 (1992).
135. See Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 909, 106 Stat. 3672, 3874 (1992). The Housing and
Community Development Act amended the CRA by adding the following language:
In assessing and taking into account ... the record of ... [majority-
owned institutions], the appropriate Federal financial supervisory
agency may consider as a factor capital investment, loan participation,
and other ventures undertaken by the institution in cooperation with
minority- and women-owned financial institutions and low-income
credit unions provided that these activities help meet the credit needs
of local communities in which such institutions and credit unions are
chartered.
Id.
136. See Colby, supra note 37, at 50. For example, Minority-owned Boston Bank of
Commerce received equity infusions from Bank of Boston, Fleet Bank, and Boston Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. In addition, NationsBank invested in Commonwealth National
Bank of Mobile, Alabama, and Founders National Bank, a minority-owned financial insti-
tution in Los Angeles, received an infusion from BankAmerica. See id.
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from the majority banks."'37
In addition to joining the trend of mergers and acquisitions and
seeking investments from the large banks, minority banks might ex-
pand their customer base and try to establish a more mainstream
status in order to survive the fierce competition they face from ma-
jority-owned banks. Some minority banks are already moving in this
direction. As a result of growing competition, more African-
American-owned banks are "reaching out for mainstream status,"
according to the president of the National Bankers Association, a
trade group in Washington that represents minority-owned banksLm
For example, Citizens Trust Bank, the largest African-American-
owned bank in Atlanta, is trying to attract white, Korean, and His-
panic customers for the first time in its seventy-two-year history in an
effort to diversify its base in order to gain a competitive edge.'39 An-
other example of a minority bank seeking a more "mainstream"
status is MetroBank, a bank founded by Taiwanese-Americans in
1987, which is among the fastest growing banks in the Houston met-
ropolitan area.O4 This bank recognized that Houston's Asian
population was not big enough to fuel the sort of growth it sought, so
the bank reached out to other communities.'
4
'
In addition to establishing a more "mainstream" status, some of
the minority banks might seek to improve their own CRA ratings as a
means of competing with larger banks.' 42 A number of minority-
owned banks have been criticized for serving only the wealthiest mi-
norities and turning away the less affluent loan applicants due to fear
of losing money on risky loans.' For example, an analysis of Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act data showed that, although minority banks
make significantly more housing loans to minorities, they single out
137. Id. (statement of Allen J. McDonald, Jr.).
138. Byrd, supra note 3, at 33 (statement of Samuel L. Foggie).
139. See id. Citizens Trust Bank advertised with thirteen billboards in English, Ko-
rean, and Spanish in predominately white areas with the following slogan on the
billboards: "Look to us .... [W]e listen." Id.
140. See Rick Wartzman, Minority Player: How Tiny MetroBank Wins Big by Cater-
ing to an Ethnic Market, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1996, at Al.
141. See id. MetroBank has not fully realized its vision in reaching out to the African-
American community. It has begun taking steps to increase its African-American cus-
tomer base such as hiring several African-American consultants, but the bank fell short of
meeting its goal of making 25 loans to African-Americans in 1995 by five. See id. On the
whole, Asian banks are under strong criticism for focusing on Asian groups to the exclu-
sion of other underserved ethnic individuals, particularly African-Americans and Latinos.
See O'Hara, supra note 23, at 6.
142. See Cox, supra note 119.
143. See Byrd, supra note 3, at 36.
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the wealthiest individuals in their communities more than do most
other banks."' According to a 1993 study by a Washington consultant
who analyzes CRA ratings for corporations interested in working
with minority financial institutions, minority banks and thrifts had
much lower CRA ratings than other banks.45 Only ten percent of all
banks received "needs to improve" or "substantial noncompliance"
ratings, but twenty-four percent of minority banks were given these
low CRA ratings.'46 Among the minority banks, CRA performance
varied and Asian banks received much lower ratings than African-
American and Hispanic banks." If these studies are accurate, mi-
nority banks might improve their CRA lending to compete with the
big banks, which recognized the potential risks involved, but have
nonetheless concluded that low- and moderate-income communities
are a tremendous potential source of profit.'48 For example, some
community development banks, such as South Shore Bank in Chi-
cago, exist solely to provide capital to rebuild low-income areas.'49
Large banks have found a "very profitable niche in making loans in a
black area ... and proved that some black banks were not adequately
meeting that need."'"
Improving CRA performance may not be easy for some minor-
ity-owned banks. Their poor CRA ratings may be explained by the
nature of the market they serve. More specifically, minority banks
often have customers with poor credit histories which makes lending
for the banks difficult. 5' The executive vice president at Family
Savings bank in South Central Los Angeles explained that "[p]eople
with poor credit histories who can't prove that they will be able to
repay their loans will not get a loan."'' 2 Similarly, minority banks
serve neighborhoods with higher percentages of low- and moderate-
income borrowers.53 Frequently, an "upper-income family" in an
144. See Cox, supra note 119, at 1.
145. See id. A 1991 study found that $17.6 billion was the average asset size of banks
receiving the highest CRA ratings, whereas the average asset size of banks receiving the
lowest CRA ratings was $55 million. See Miller, supra note 87, at 1110.
146. See Cox, supra note 119, at 8.
147. See id. Among minority groups, 8% of African-American banks received "needs
to improve" or "substantial noncompliance," while 20% of Hispanic banks and 36% of
Asian banks received the low ratings. See id.
148. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
149. See Byrd, supra note 3, at 36.
150. Id. (statement of William M. Cunningham).
151. See Cox, supra note 119, at 8.
152. Id. (statement of Ron Thigpen).
153. See id. Poorer neighborhoods comprised 10% of areas served by all banks, but
they accounted for 31% of the neighborhoods served by minority banks. See id.
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inner-city neighborhood earns much less money than the "upper-
income family" in the suburbs.'- 4 The chairman of the National
Bankers Association explained, " '[w]e are dealing with a community
that by and large makes only [sixty percent] of the average family in-
come, so we inevitably end up' with borrowers whose credit histories
are poor."'5' In addition, minority banks are, on the whole, less stable
than larger banks and in less of a position to offer the creative lend-
ing that is required to attract and serve the low- and moderate-
income communities. 156  Nevertheless, some minority bankers ac-
knowledge that minority-owned banks have room to improve their
lending to lower-income borrowers."'
In addition to participating in the trend of mergers and acquisi-
tions, seeking investments from large banks, expanding their
customer base, and improving their CRA ratings, minority-owned
banks should focus on and increase lending to churches in order to
remain competitive with the large banks. Five years ago minority
banks provided the majority of church loans, but large banks are
starting to develop a niche in the church lending market."8 As
churches are growing, they have a tremendous need for financing,
and they are considered extremely reliable borrowers." In Washing-
ton, D.C., churches in predominately black communities are
borrowing millions of dollars to build sanctuaries, social-service fa-
cilities, child-care centers, and low-income housing."W The big banks
are developing relationships with these churches and using their
154. See id.
155. Id. (statement of Jesse H. Turner who is also the president and chief executive of
Tri-State Bank of Memphis).
156. See id. ("We are in a competitive business, and the larger banks have more re-
sources than we have and can afford large signs and plenty of circulars." (statement of
Richard T. Greene, president and CEO of a $320 million Harlem thrift, Carver Federal
Savings Bank)).
157. See id.
158. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 18.
159. See Singletary, Religious Facilities, supra note 79, at A12; see also Marshall, supra
note 18, at 18 ("In the past, a church loan used to be for an amount of $300,000 to
$400,000. Now, church projects are averaging in the millions." (statement of John Hamil-
ton, president of Advance Federal Savings in Baltimore)).
160. See Singletary, Religious Facilities, supra note 79. Some of the big projects in the
Washington D.C. area include: The Way of the Cross Church of Christ in Largo recently
borrowed $10 million to buy a larger facility for its growing congregation; Ebenezer
A.M.E. Church in Fort Washington built an $8.4 million facility and may need to expand
again in the near future; New Foundation A.U.E. Zion Church in Southeast Washington
developed five town homes in Arlington for approximately $1 million, and in the near
future the church hopes to borrow $22 million for additional building projects. See id.
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church lending as a way to begin serving the black church members.161
They realize making church loans is good business. Church lending
serves to recruit individual customers and comply with the CRA."
Advance Federal Savings in Baltimore has relied on church lending
as a lucrative source of business lending.'63 Church lending accounts
for about fifteen to twenty percent of the institution's loan portfolio,
and the church loans are some of the bank's soundest."6 The presi-
dent of Advance Federal said that in most cases churches pay off
their loans ahead of time and that the bank has experienced only one
church loan foreclosure in its history. 65 In the face of heightened
competition from big banks, minority banks should aggressively seek
to increase and maintain their church lending.
The final strategy minority-owned banks might adopt in order to
effectively compete with larger banks is to take advantage of the
small, community-oriented nature of their banks. Minority banks
"know the community ... [a]nd the community knows and trusts
them. The banks aren't these huge bureaucratic voice-mail opera-
tions," commented the founder of Communities for Accountable
Reinvestment in Los Angeles.' 6 Minority-owned banks are in a posi-
tion to utilize the "old-fashioned approach" of getting to know the
customer in order to successfully compete with the bigger banks. In
contrast, the tremendous size of some "mainstream" banks makes it
more difficult for them than for the smaller, more locally-focused mi-
nority-owned banks to develop a relationship with individual
customers. According to the top executives of several minority insti-
tutions, "being there" is a critical part of their success.67 "Being
there" requires "introducing customers to basic banking and home-
ownership, easing customer banking angst, perhaps lending to
neighborhood churches and small businesses, and helping people in
many little ways that may sound mundane but often mean a lot. ' 8
Ultimately, despite the new challenges minority banks face as a
result of the CRA, several strategies exist that have enabled many of
the minority-owned banks to remain competitive with their more
"mainstream" peers and these strategies should serve as examples for
161. See id. at A12.
162. See id.
163. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 18.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Byrd, supra note 3, at 36 (statement of Gilda Haas).
167. Marshall, supra note 18, at 16.
168. Id.
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the minority banks that continue to struggle. First, minority-owned
banks can join the recent trend of mergers and acquisitions.'69 In ad-
dition, they can seek investments from the large banks as a means of
increasing capital,"' establish a more "mainstream" status,' improve
their CRA ratings,"n and increase lending to churches.' Finally, mi-
nority-owned banks should take advantage of the community-
oriented nature of their banks in order to remain competitive with
the larger banks.'74
VI. CONCLUSION
The Community Reinvestment Act encourages financial institu-
tions to meet the credit needs of their local communities, and the Act
has experienced success in this endeavor.'7" This success will con-
tinue, and even grow, as the new revisions to the CRA become fully
effective for both large and small banks. Ironically, however, the Act
has inadvertently created fierce competition for some financial insti-
tutions-minority-owned banks. The CRA forces large banks into
markets traditionally served by minority banks, and the
"mainstream" banks offer services and products with which the mi-
nority banks often cannot compete. "6  The Act deserves
commendation for demanding that large banks increase their lending
in underserved areas. Nevertheless, minority banks, institutions that
were established in, and to a large degree, designed to serve low- and
moderate-income communities, should not be forced out of the
banking market to accomplish this goal.
The increased competition for minority banks by no means sig-
nals the demise of Victory Savings Bank in South Carolina, Boston
Bank of Commerce, or other minority-owned banks. It may mean,
however, that banks such as these will struggle for survival so long as
CRA is stringently enforced by federal regulators. However, there
are many ways minority banks can respond to the new competition
they face from "mainstream" banks.' As might be expected, many
minority-owned banks have already demonstrated their capacity to
169. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 142-57 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 76-114 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 76-114 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 125-73 and accompanying text.
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prevail in the face of this competition and have adopted strategies
that will ensure their long-term survival.178
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178. See supra notes 125-73 and accompanying text.
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